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ABSTRACT
The paper sheds new light on the Russian Federation’s economic security problem in the face of 
sanctions and changing geopolitical balance in Central Asia. The novelty of the research perspective and, 
subsequently, the results and conclusions are expressed by combining an economic perspective with a cul-
tural-political and media-centered approach. There were analysed the range of Russo-Iranian economic 
cooperation, the factors that make Iran a prospective partner for Russia and the role of the Russian media 
in shaping the picture of friendly future in bilateral relations. The conclusions are that the Russian “turn to 
the South” – towards Iran – was provoked not only by the sanctions imposed which decreased the economic 
security level but it also resulted from the previously established patterns of the Russian foreign policy.  
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INTRODUCTION
The Russian Federation’s economic security problem in the face of sanctions 
and changing geopolitical balance in Central Asia is analysed in the paper. The 
novelty of the research perspective and, subsequently, the results and conclusions 
are expressed by combining economic perspective with cultural-political and me-
dia-centered approach. The three main issues are discussed, namely: the range of 
Russo-Iranian economic cooperation, the factors that make Iran a prospective partner 
for Russia and the Russian media role in shaping the picture of friendly future in 
bilateral relations. The research question was the following: Was the Russian “turn to 
the South” – towards Iran – provoked only by the sanctions imposed that decreased 
the economic security level or was it a result of the previously established patterns 
of the Russian foreign policy, too?
Motivations for undertaking the research problem results from the similarity of 
Russia and Iran in terms of their political leadership and strategic partnership. Both 
countries have legal foundations of their political systems. Nevertheless, decisions 
and solutions are rooted in cultural patterns and mentality. Russian and Iranian pres-
idents are elected in general elections but their power is supported and informally 
legitimized by trusted people and authority of a “strong man”. The experts who 
hold the most important positions in military, economy and information sectors are 
also the ones from the closest presidential environment. The strategic Russo-Iranian 
partnership, in turn, is based on the common activities to weaken the position of 
the United States both in global and local perspectives. Pro-state mentality of the 
president of the Russian Federation and of the leaders of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran favors mutual cooperation.
The issues of economic security intertwined with cultural and mentality patterns 
and media influence on their strengthening are the new perspective on the problem of 
Russo-Iranian cooperation, which, so far, was discussed mainly from geopolitical and 
political perspectives. The research hypothesis that cooperation with Iran is aimed at 
increasing Russia’s economic security and its influence in Iran is likely to be proved.
The research are based on hard data such as economic indicators and analysis of 
the variables concerning mainly oil and gas sales. The supportive and supplementary 
soft data are television programs contents, and cultural patterns analysis – mainly the 
state documents regarding leadership roles. Methodology of the research consists of 
quantitative analyses of economic data and qualitative analyses of the Russian media 
discourse and institutional dimension of bilateral cooperation, such as meetings of 
both leaders and international conferences.
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ECONOMIC STABILITY OF ThE RUSSIAN FEDERATION: ThE PRESENT STATE
There is no unequivocal and commonly accepted definition of “economic se-
curity” in literature on the subject. Nevertheless, most authors agree that economic 
security can be viewed as a set of internal (such as economic potential of a state, its 
macro-economic stability, and economic policy) and external factors (position of 
a state in the international environment) that affect economic situation of a country 
[Frejtag-Mika, Kołodziejak, Putkiewicz 1996: 28]. In the internal perspective, eco-
nomic security is reduced to economic stability of a state.
Both international institutions and the Russian economists who estimate econom-
ic stability of the Russian Federation pay attention to the fact that its level decreased 
recently. The Global Competitiveness Report, of the World Economic Forum, presents 
a comparative analysis of economic development of countries and explores their 
economic stability. It is estimated by such indicators as: budget balance, public sector 
savings level, inflation ratio, the public debt level and rating of a country. 
According to the data of Global Competitiveness Report from the years 2008–
2016, macroeconomic stability of the Russian Federation decreased in the last 4 years. 
Initially, in 2011–2013, the economic stability of Russia tends to increase, which 
is recognized by the obtained scores – from 5.2 (2011) to 5.9 (2013) out of 7. In 
addition, a higher position of Russia in global rankings in comparison with other 
states can be observed – an increase from 44th position in 2011 to 19th in 2013, out 
of 140 analysed economies. In the following years, however, the indicators changed 
– in 2014, Russia was on 31st position (5.5 scores), two years later, it was classified 
as 91st (4.3) (Table 1). The data indicate that the level of economic stability and, as 
a consequence, economic security of the Russian Federation decreased [Falkowski 
2015: 153–172].
Table 1. Macroeconomic environment of the Russian Federation (2008–2016)
Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Scores 5.6 5.5 4.5 5.2 5.8 5.9 5.5 5.3 4.3
Place 29 36 79 44 22 19 31 40 91
Source: The Global Competitiveness Report, World Economic Forum, 2008–2016.
Research of Russian economists (among others, members of the Russian Acade-
my of Sciences, RAN), who estimated the level of economic security of the country 
by referring to 18 indicators, revealed similar results. The indicators were the follow-
ing: production growth, condition of the federal budget, level of indebtedness of the 
state, the proportion of citizens with income below social minimum, the ratio of the 
income of 10% richest to the 10% poorest [Strukov, Slepokurova 2017: 238–252].
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Figure 1. Economic safety margin for the Russian Federation (1998–2016)
Source: Strukov, Slepokurova [2017: 238–252].
In 1998–2013, the aggregate level of Russia’s national security tends to grow. 
In 2013, in turn, the period of rapid decrease in the level of safety started – from 12 
to 3 scores (Figure 1).
DECREASE IN ThE LEVEL OF ECONOMIC SECURITY OF ThE RUSSIAN 
FEDERATION – CAUSES
The high level of economic stability and, as a result, economic security of the 
Russian Federation resulted from high oil prices in world markets. It was due to the 
fact that the income from export sales of energy (oil mostly) makes the main part 
of the Russian federal budget income – about 50%. Energy industry has been the 
foundation of the Russian economy. 
In 2000–2008, an average oil price increased from USD 27 (2000) to USD 94 
(2008) for a barrel. That was a uniquely favourable time for Russian economy: oil 
and oil products export income increased from USD 36.2 billion in 2000 to USD 241 
billion in 2008. Gross domestic product (GDP), in turn, increased by about 8% a year 
and only in 2010–2013, it slightly slowed down [GDP growth… 2019]. In 2014, 
however, negative dynamics of Russia’s GDP was recorded which was tantamount 
to the decline in the country’s economic stability [GDP growth… 2019].
The decrease was a consequence of a drop in oil prices in the world markets. In 
2014–2015, it was from USD 98 to USD 54 for a barrel. There is a high correlation 
between oil price and Russia’s GDP – 0.98 (max is 1.0), and therefore it is obvious 
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Figure 2. Urals crude oil price vs. Russian GDP in the years 1989–2017
Source: Neft' sovremennoy Rossii: +/– 20 let, “Neftegazovaja Vertikal” vol. 21, p. 9 [2015].
GDP (current US$) – Russian Federation, World Bank Data, 8 November 2019, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/
NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=RU (access: 09.07.2020).
Thus, maintaining low oil prices (USD 25–40 for a barrel) is the main threat to 
Russia’s economic stability. The economic downturn, the outflow of capital, a de-
crease in investment activity, increased inflation and a drop in real wages combined 
with an increase in the unemployment rate were the derivatives of the low oil prices.
GEOPOLITICS AND RUSSIA’S ECONOMIC SECURITY
Together with direct economic causes that affect economy conditions, some 
geopolitical factors, as well as relations with the near and far neighbourhood have 
to be taken into account. They stabilize or destabilize country’s economic security 
to a great extent. 
Russia has been strengthening its international position on the basis of energetic 
potential since the beginning of the 21st century. As the main supplier of oil and gas 
to the EU market it makes effort to maintain good relations with the most import-
ant EU member states. It was due to the inflow of investments from the West and 
constant economic cooperation. The above-mentioned inflow of investments to the 
Russian energy sector was necessary because the previously exploited oil-gas fields 
were mostly depleted [Korzhubaev, Jeder 2010: 14–20]. In order to maintain the ex-
traction of oil and gas at the present level and to guarantee economic stability, Russia 
has to develop non-traditional Arctic fields that have complex geological structure. 
Realisation of those highly capital-consuming projects has been possible only when 
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Russia’s energy policy towards the other weaker EU member states and the 
former Eastern Bloc countries was getting more and more assertive every year. As 
a result, crude oil and natural gas are often used by Russia as a bargaining chip in 
relations with those countries. 
RUSSIA’S ECONOMIC SECURITY UNDER SANCTIONS
Due to the Ukrainian conflict, that ended with the Crimean annexation, the 
political situation became less stable. After the events in 2014, the USA and the EU 
imposed sanctions on Russia: American and European companies were prohibited 
to cooperate with Russian energy companies, to supply equipment for work in the 
Russian part of the Arctic, on the continental shelf, in the fields with unconventional 
reserves and shales. All kinds of services for the projects were also banned. The U.S. 
sanctions were imposed on all the biggest Russian oil companies – Gazprom Neft, 
Lukoil, Surgutneftegas, Rosneft, Transneft, or Gazprom. EU sanctions did not include 
gas industry which was the consequence of the fact that the EU market depends on 
Russian gas supplies to a greater extent than in the case of oil sector. 
The long-lasting and successively prolonged western sanctions effectively ham-
pered the process of developing fields in new prospective regions of the country. 
Consequently, the biggest country’s oil company Rosneft and also some other Rus-
sian companies lost financial and technological support of their key foreign partners 
[Kutuzova 2018: 18–12].
The American concern ExxonMobil, by the decision to stop its activity in Russia, 
caused the greatest damages in Russian oil industry. Cooperation agreement between 
ExxonMobil and Rosneft (2013–2014) involved implementation of 10 common 
projects, such as research and exploitation on the Black Sea shelf, in the Arctic and 
Western Siberia. As a result of the sanctions, the American oil giant abandoned 
nine out of the commonly realized projects [ExxonMobil… 2014]. In this situation, 
Rosneft halted the capital-consuming projects on the Arctic shelf till the lifting of 
the sanctions. 
Following the U.S. sanctions imposed on Russia, European companies also have 
to obey the restrictions. Shell cancelled exploitation of the Bazhenovsky fields in 
Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug and the British BP halted the project which had 
been realized with Rosneft in Orenburg Oblast in Western Siberia. As a result of the 
sanctions, newly started cooperation between Lukoil and Total was broken. In May 
2014, both companies agreed to set up a joint venture company in order to exploit 
Bazhenovsky fields in three concession areas of Western Siberia [Total… 2015].
According to estimations, the sanctions affected about 90% of operations in the 
Russian oil industry. Russian companies lost access to the imported technologies 
and equipment which were necessary to exploit the shelf or non-traditional oil-gas 
fields. Proportion of the imported equipment in the Russian oil sector hesitated from 
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50% in the unconventional reserves segment to 80% in the LNG segment and shelf 
exploitation.
Experts estimates that western sanctions can paralyze about one fourth of the 
Russian oil sector and bring about the decrease in oil exploitation to 32 million tonnes 
every year in the mid-term perspective and to 100 million tonnes – in the long-term 
perspective. If the sanctions are prolonged, the decrease tendency will become more 
and more obvious every following year. Moreover, the Russians themselves admit, 
nowadays geopolitical sanctions result in losses of USD 40 billion every year, which 
causes a decrease in the level of economic stability [hartukov 2018: 4–10].
Therefore, the extension of sanctions imposed by the West on Russia, may result 
in a decrease of economic security of the state in the mid- and long-term perspective. 
RUSSIA’S “TURN TO ThE EAST”: IDEOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES
The West has been important for Russia not only in the perspective of economy, 
including economic safety and policy, but also in terms of identity, which is ex-
pressed implicite as the imperial one and the identity of superpower. Russia wanted 
to play a significant role in shaping the European political order and that striving 
was satisfied many times: Congress of Vienna (1815), Treaty of Versailles (1919), 
Tehran – Yalta – Potsdam Conferences (1943–1945). Those periods of glory were 
interrupted by conflicts with European powers and, in consequence, Russian turn 
towards the East. Nowadays, these are not European countries, but the USA that is 
the main rival for the Russian Federation. Nevertheless, the mechanism of seeking 
solutions by turning to the countries to the east and south of Russia’s borders has 
remained unchanged. 
To explain the reasons for the present change of the vectors in Russian policy, 
experts point to three aspects: lack of the possibility to demonstrate Russia’s influence 
in rivalry with the USA in the international arena, continuity of the 19th-century par-
adigm which places Russia between the West and the East; the response to economic 
development of Asian countries, especially China. The latter reason makes Asian 
countries a prospective partner of Russia. Nevertheless, it is worth remembering 
that the reasons for “turn to the East” are not solely of an economic character, nor 
do they stem from the coherent state policy.
[…] even now a part of the elitès is afraid of the “turn to the East”, because they 
associate it with giving up European civilisational identity and they stay comfortably 
in a constant, although obsolete, system of landmarks, where Europe is associated with 
progress, Asia and Eurasia – with marginal, superpower’s Eurasianism. [Karaganov, 
Makarov 2017]
98 MAŁGORZATA ABASSY, AGATA KRZYWDZIŃSKA, KATARZYNA KOSOWSKA
It is enough to trace back Russian history and the geopolitical concepts rooted 
in culture and mentality to conclude that the Russian Federation recognizes itself 
as a partner in political games with European countries and the USA, whereas the 
East is used as a tool in struggle for power and reinforcement of the state’s security 
at different levels. One of them is economic safety focused mainly on energy safety. 
Leonid Kozlov shares the opinion that the Russian “turn to the East” was pro-
voked by the international situation and it has a rather tactic than strategic character 
[Kozlov 2016]. Russia’s tactic partnership with China and Iran results from the 
problem all three countries have in terms of shaping satisfactory relations with the 
USA. Since the Ukrainian crisis in 2014, Russia’s relations with the EU countries 
and the USA deteriorated. That situation led Russian political elites to turn to the 
South – the direction which has been a traditional vector of territorial, economic and 
political expansion from the times of Tsar Peter I. All the vectors are interrelated 
although in every historical period one of them tends to be in the first place. One 
can assume that without taking into account the cultural context, the conclusions 
will be misleading. Thus, each economic activity has its ideological background and 
it is aimed at broadening and strengthening influence on a territory. Consequently, 
strengthening Russia’s economic safety by its cooperation with the Islamic Republic 
of Iran is, at the same time, an effort to broaden Russia’s influence in this country, 
realize Russia’s interests and protect its state identity.
“TURN TO ThE SOUTh”: BETWEEN COOPERATION AND RIVALRY
Two vectors are present in Russia’s politics towards Iran: striving for cooperation 
and creating the role of Iran’s partner in regional security policy versus treating Iran as 
a tool in the Russian game with the USA in the struggle for influence in Central Asia. 
Those vectors are often complementary but, even more frequently, they are separate.
For Russia, Iran is the only partner with whom multi-dimensional partnership 
is possible due to common areas of influence, two centuries of shared history, great 
significance of both countries in the region, similar styles of governing and ease of 
communication conditioned by mentality. The last factor is often underestimated in 
political science experts’ reports. The foundation for cooperation, which results from 
political interests and which is rooted in mentality, has played an equally great role 
in both countries. According to experts, the present Russo-Iranian cooperation has 
reached the unprecedented level and it tends to grow. The fact was also stressed by 
Iranian President hassan Rouhani at the meeting in Sochi, on 22 November 2017: 
“I am happy that in the last year, relations between our countries were good. And 
our cooperation had positive character not only in bilateral but also in regional and 
international dimensions” [Vstrecha… 2017].
In 2013–2014, President Vladimir Putin and President hassan Rouhani met 
four times: on 13 September 2013 at the Forum of the Council of heads of States of 
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the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation in Bishkek; on 21 May at the Conference 
on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA) in Shanghai; on 
12 September 2014 at the Council of heads of States of the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organisation in Dushanbe, and on 29 September 2014 at the 4th Caspian Summit in 
Astrakhan. A series of meetings was continued in 2015–2018. Energy security was 
the subject of conversation during numerous meetings, either as declarations or as 
working out strategies. At a press conference, Putin said: 
We talked about cooperation in the energy sector. All three countries have good 
oil-gas resources and they have a unique regional and international location. We talked 
about cooperation in oil and gas exploitation technology industry. We also talked about 
investments into the energy sector, which play an important role for our countries. [Za-
javlenija dlja pressy po itogam vstrechi Vladimira… 2017]
Another tripartite meeting, this time between Vladimir Putin, hassan Rouhani 
and Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, focused on finding a solution to the 
Syrian conflict. At press conferences, the leaders stressed significance and efficiency 
of the worked out solutions and they declared further cooperation aimed at main-
taining stability in the region [Vstrecha… 2017].
Economic relations, including energy security issues, were incorporated into 
a wider context of inner integrity of the countries, which was understood as policy 
transparency and respect for the values expressed implicite. The motivations for 
strengthening cooperation in economic and oil gas industry sectors are clear. Nev-
ertheless, the strivings of political character may disturb them. Thus, an assumption 
has to be made that the market economy is determined by political decisions of the 
heads of the states and the latter ones result from the struggle for power in the region.
Safety issues play a substantial role in building the economic cooperation strat-
egy. They require consideration of political interests, both Russian and Iranian. The 
problem of Syria, namely its post-war order, is in the foreground. At the beginning 
of cooperation with regard to the post-war order in Syria, Moscow’s and Tehran’s 
positions were convergent. however, it has changed. Russia starts to criticize Syrian 
President Bashar al-Assad and would expect some quality changes in Syrian society 
in order to prevent such events like the Arab Spring. Iran opposes to such move. 
Concerning the post-war order in Syria, Russia’s perspective is close to the USA’s 
expectations, which concerns Iran. In Iranian mentality the pattern is activated that 
Russia one more time sacrifices its relations with Iran to strengthen relations with 
the USA. Moreover, in contrast to Iran, Russia has long experience in the field of 
diplomatic games and negotiations with the Western countries. With reference to 
the Syrian problem, knowledge of the regional specificity and Shiite mentality, or 
more generally of the country’s Islamic society, would favor Russia’s partnership 
with Iran. however, striving for the establishment of Islamic democracy in Syria 
is contrary to the intentions and interests of both Russia and the Western countries. 
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POLITICAL FACTORS CONDUCIVE TO ECONOMIC COOPERATION
Both the Russian Federation and Iran have been the subjects of U.S. confron-
tational policy. Such an opinion has been confirmed by the following facts: on 7 
April 2018, 38 representatives of the Russian business and policy were included 
into the list of people subject to sanctions – there were also some big companies 
among them, such as Rosoboronexport; on 11 April 2018, President Donald Trump 
tweeted about U.S. readiness to intervene in Syria because of an alleged attack with 
chemical weapons use and the burden of it was on Russia and Iran; a new project of 
sanction appeared on the U.S. Congress website and it assumed that Russia would 
be disconnected from the international banking system. Valery Solovjov, a historian 
in the Moscow State Institute of International Relations, claims that within 1–1.5 
years, American activities would have a systemic character (instead of temporary), 
in order to put pressure and force Russia to modify its domestic and foreign policy. 
There are many factors that make Iran an attractive and perspective partner for 
Russia. First of all, it has a large and well-trained army made up of 350,000 soldiers. 
It consists of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and al-Quds formation who 
are known for their devotion to Islamic revolution ideals and their mission is to 
protect, preserve and propagate them. Moreover, Iran is a Shiite country which has 
an influence on Shiite communities in other Muslim countries, such as Iraq, Syria, 
Libya, Yemen, Afghanistan, Bahrain. It also has an important position in the region 
due to its proximity to the Caucasus countries, Afghanistan and Pakistan. 
With regard to economic cooperation, Iran has huge resources of oil and gas 
(about 34,000 m3). In this respect, it ranks second, behind Russia. Due to the lack 
of infrastructure, and hence limited possibilities of extraction and transmission of 
oil, Iran becomes a potential market for Russia. Iran also has significant human re-
sources which increases its economic potential: at present, Iran’s population is about 
80 million people, 49% of whom are of working age [Iran Demographics Profile 
2018]. As for non-political and non-economic factors, it is worth remembering that 
Iran has a long tradition of strong central power which helps to communicate with 
Russia on the mental level. Pragmatism in actions is supported with trust credit in 
the situations were a precise calculation of gains and losses is impossible. 
The above-mentioned qualities make Iran one of the most influential countries 
in the region and an important player in Central Asia. 
ThE RUSSIAN FEDERATION IN IRAN’S ENERGETIC SECTOR
Russia played a considerable role in the settlement of the issue of the Iranian 
“nuclear question”. After the sanctions had been lifted, new opportunities for re-
inforcement economic cooperation occurred. It referred to many areas, including 
oil and gas sectors. In November 2017, the “oil for goods” project was initiated. 
ECONOMIC SECURITY OF ThE RUSSIAN FEDERATION… 101
According to the agreement, Moscow agreed to buy Iranian oil, while Iran would 
use half of the payments received from Russia to buy and import its goods. From 
2018 onwards, Russia plans to buy 5 million tonnes of Iranian oil per year. Russian 
Trade Representative in Iran, Andre Luganski, declared that Russia may export goods 
worth USD 45 million under the “oil for goods” project. The project, however, does 
not accept the supply of weapon as a commodity.
Many Russian companies, such as Gazprom, Rosneft, Gazprom Neft, Zarubezh-
neft, Tatneft, Lukoil, hold conversations concerning oil exploitation in Iran. Some 
other energy companies negotiate agreements concerning project implementation, 
extraction and processing of oil and natural gas (liquefied natural gas, LNG), trans-
mission pipelines, industry, or petrochemicals. The Russian state-controlled company 
Zarubezhneft demonstrates a particular interest in the oil extraction project in Iran. 
The Rosgeology holding declares its readiness to provide maintenance services for 
Iranian partners. Technopromexport, in turn, intends to participate in the projects of 
building oil and natural gas processing plants, and to provide the services concerning 
oil and gas field development. Moreover, West Siberian Oil and Gas Company is 
interested in the projects of development and exploitation hydrocarbons in Iranian 
fields. Power engineering is also a perspective direction of Russo-Iranian cooperation. 
It concerns, inter alia, reconstruction of old power plants, construction of new ones, 
and participation in the nuclear energy development. 
RUSSIAN MEDIA ABOUT RUSSO-IRANIAN COOPERATION
Economic Russo-Iranian cooperation is a subject of analyses and comments in 
most Russian media. Russia-24 (Rossiya-24) and Channel One (Pervyy kanal) can 
be regarded as the most representative. They have the biggest range and viewership 
[Brandmedia 2020]. Three topics enjoyed the greatest interest, namely sanctions im-
posed on Iran, nuclear energy (Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant) and power engineering. 
In the information services of most TV stations it was stressed that new agreements 
concern the construction of two nuclear units in the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant. 
It was agreed that Russia would supply nuclear fuel and it would also deal with its 
utilization as Iran does not have appropriate technologies [Rossija postroit… 2014]. 
It was decided that some new nuclear units, called “Bushehr 2”, would be built in 
subsequent years. Moreover, Russia committed to train the Iranians within the frames 
of cooperation [Rossija postroit… 2014].
Russia-24 broadcast a report devoted to the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant entitled 
Atom Irana. Spetsial'nyy reportazh Pavla Orlova [Orlov 2015] (Eng.: Atom of Iran. 
A Special Report by Pavel Orlov). The journalist’s report on his visit to the power 
station explains in details Russo-Iranian relations that date back to the 1990s. The 
construction of the plant was initiated in 1974 by German companies. It was to be 
the first nuclear power plant in the Near East but its construction was interrupted by 
102 MAŁGORZATA ABASSY, AGATA KRZYWDZIŃSKA, KATARZYNA KOSOWSKA
the revolution of 1979. Moscow and Tehran discussed the issue again in 1992. Then 
an agreement for the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes was signed. It took 
a long time before some technical changes in the German project were introduced, and 
chilled water required in the power plant, was brought from the Persian Gulf [Orlov 
2015]. The cooperation between Iran and Russia was held in a good atmosphere; the 
Iranians acquired a good knowledge of Russian vocabulary (technical terms). What is 
more, differences in terms of religion did not form any barrier to mutual cooperation 
[Orlov 2015]. Kiril Komarov, the first deputy CEO of Rosatom, stressed the fact that 
the activity of the state-owned company abroad brought huge benefits for the country: 
“[…] we think of Russia’s interests first. Every power plant construction abroad brings 
a huge effect for the Russian economy. These are tens of thousands of workplaces, 
these are billions of dollars of income to budget from taxes” [Orlov 2015].
On 11 September 2016, Channel One announced that the “Bushehr 2” project 
was initiated. Its investment value is measured in billions of dollars and the second 
and third units are planned to be completed in 2024 and 2026. The power generation 
capacity of the Bushehr plant is 1,000 MW and in the case of two new units – 2,100 
MW [Rossija i Iran… 2016]. Both sides regard the project as a matter of pride be-
cause they succeed to combine the contemporary technologies and equipment with 
the old German project. In the long-term perspective it is planned to construct eight 
units [Rossija i Iran… 2016].
LIFTING OF SANCTION FOR IRAN: NEW PERSPECTIVES AFTER 
YEARS OF RESTRICTIONS
Suspension of the economic and financial sanctions against Iran affected also 
energy industry. When the long-standing conflict concerning the Iranian nuclear 
program was over, Russia-24 called the 16th January 2016 a “holiday” and this fact 
was recorded by all Iranian newspapers [Osvobozhdennyj… 2016]. The achieved 
agreement resulted from the fulfillment of international obligations by Iran. Thanks 
to that, the country could return to the world market. President Rouhani commented 
on the event in public: “Atom agreement with the world powers starts a gold page 
in our country’s history. What has been achieved is the whole nation’s victory” 
[Osvobozhdennyj… 2016].
Russia-24 journalists described the event as a historical one. In short TV material, 
which summed up the “previous Iranian experience of sanctions”, they mentioned 
that the first sanctions were imposed by the USA in the 1970s [Osvobozhdennyj… 
2016]. It was recalled that in 2005, Mahmud Ahmadinejad, who strongly believed that 
Iran needs to develop nuclear energy, became president of the country. Consequently, 
in 2006, the United Nations imposed sanctions on Iran for developing the nuclear 
program [Osvobozhdennyj… 2016]. Only after hassan Rouhani became president, 
an agreement was signed that Iran freezes some aspects of its nuclear program in 
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exchange for partial lifting of sanctions. Iran agreed to reduce its reserves of enriched 
uranium to 20% [Osvobozhdennyj… 2016].
On 28 March 2017, an official visit of President Rouhani in Moscow took place. 
he met Vladimir Putin and they signed documents concerning, among others, energy 
and technology spheres [Davydov 2017]. In the news service Vesti, on Russia 1, the 
visit was estimated as bringing mutual relations to a new level. In the conversation 
with Rouhani, Putin said that the up-to-present cooperation was very good: “Iran 
is our good neighbor and a reliable partner. It is enough to say that the last year’s 
exchange of goods between our countries increased by 70% which is a specific 
phenomenon in difficult circumstances” [Davydov 2017].
REINFORCEMENT OF RUSSO-IRANIAN COOPERATION WIThIN “BUShEhR 2”
Russia-24 refocused on the subject of power plant construction at the end of 
October 2017. Special correspondent of the station, Olga Bashmarova, prepared 
material about Iran. The construction had to be preceded by strengthening and sta-
bilization of the area due to the fact that Iran is in the region of great seismic activity 
[Bashmarova 2017]. Iran has an extremely high level of energy consumption and 
this conclusion results from the opinions included in the program. Vice-president 
Ali Akbar Salehi estimates that the country’s energy demands are higher than is 
currently the case: “[…] Iran needs 20 thousand megawatts of electricity. It can be 
produced by 20 such units. It is obvious that such a number of power plants requires 
huge investments” [Bashmarova 2017].
A manager of the Bushehr unit paid attention to the fact that for the Iranians, 
Russia’s engagement in the Iranian peace program, at a time when the whole world 
was against it, was very important [Bashmarova 2017]. The new reactor had to meet 
safety requirements after the Fukushima accident. Both countries’ cooperation within 
its frames went smoothly: the Bushehr Power Plant operates properly, its staff was 
trained in Moscow, they speak fluent Russian. however, they are not allowed to give 
interviews and to be camera-recorded due to safety reasons [Bashmarova 2017].
Energetic cooperation is inevitably connected with great politics and therefore 
energy security issues were again discussed on 1 November 2017 at the Tripartite 
Summit in Tehran where President Rouhani, President of Azerbaijan Ilham Alijev, and 
Russian Minister of Energy Alexander Novak met [Suvorova 2017]. Commenting on 
the meeting with the Iranian representative, Minister Novak stressed that energetic 
cooperation of both countries concerns not only the very important Bushehr plant 
but also a power plant in the southern part of Bandar Abbas. At present, Russian 
company Technopromexport participates in the latter project [Suvorova 2017]. At 
ministerial meetings, a planned project of “energetic bridge” connecting the three 
countries was discussed. Minister Novak, when he was asked about the issue, ex-
plained common plans in detail:
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Two directions for connecting energetic systems of Russia and Iran were discussed. 
The first one through Azerbaijan: Russia – Azerbaijan – Iran. The second one is through 
Russia – Georgia – Armenia – Iran. […]. To make the final decision about the integration 
of electro-energetic systems, it is necessary to conduct technical and economic research. 
Now we have created two working teams who prepare technical conditions of the elec-
tro-energetic systems connection. Generally, I think that it can bring an effect, which is 
positive for the countries participating in the process because each of the countries has 
different needs. For example, in Iran, the peak consumption period is in the summer, 
whereas in the winter, demand for energy is lower. In Russia, it is different: the peak 
consumption period is in the winter when temperatures are low. Therefore, in this part it 
is possible to achieve synergy from the point of view of efficient power placement and 
transfer the energy surplus when it is not required. [Jamshhikov 2017]
RUSSIAN TV COMMENTS
Russo-Iranian cooperation in the energy sector has been positively presented and 
commented in media for the last several years. An increase in trust at the highest 
political and diplomatic level was reflected in the opinions of the Russian state TV 
commentators who, preserving the Russo-centered point of view, expressed a pos-
itive assessment of Russia’s political and economic interests. In that context, the 
relations with the USA, whose picture has many negative and pejorative features, 
are at the opposite pole. It seems that the dynamics of Russo-Iranian relations was 
aptly expressed by the final conclusion in the comment of Bashmarova: “There is 
a great future in the Russo-Iranian relations sphere” [2017].
CONCLUSIONS
The Russian state television provided its audience with detailed information on 
the progress in cooperation with Iran, which was caused by great interest in the ally 
partner. The knowledge of the Russian was broadened by coverages of Iran. All that 
helped to create a positive image of the southern partner and made the Iranians more 
familiar with the Russian people. This way, public support for the state activities and 
president’s decisions was built and strengthened. 
The research hypothesis was positively verified: Russo-Iranian relations, espe-
cially from the point of view of strategic partnership and Russia’s economic security, 
are going to develop regardless of temporary differences. Iran has been an important 
strategic partner for Russia not only in terms of energy security but also due to the 
preservation of stability in the region. Strengthening of economic cooperation is 
supported by the fact that the Russian business elites are closely linked with the state 
political elites. In the situation when U.S.-Russian relations have been weakened 
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and in the Russian politicians’ speech the Cold War rhetoric is often heard again, 
Russo-Iranian cooperation includes, inter alia, widely understood economic and 
energetic security, Russian borders security. The question arises: will Russia choose 
Iran as its strategic partner or will it restrict itself to tactic partnership, as in previous 
years. The USA’s attitude towards Russia is still a decisive factor. 
Meetings of both countries’ leaders, numerous agreements signed between Rus-
sian and Iranian companies allow us to suppose that power engineering is just the 
first stage of the two states’ cooperation in the economic sphere. Russian media 
inform about further and broader cooperation in the oil and gas sector, reflecting the 
present state and preparing basis for future partnership. The subject requires further 
profound analyses. 
On 5 November 2018, the USA imposed sanctions on Iran’s energy sector. 
Moreover, the USA required Iran to withdraw entirely from its nuclear program. 
The Russian state TV stressed that the leading European countries, such as Germa-
ny, France, Great Britain and other EU countries deeply deplore this fact [SShA… 
2018]. Brussels stated that, despite the American sanctions, it is going to broaden its 
cooperation with Iran. The sanctions affected both companies and ordinary people 
who protested in Tehran’s streets [Vstupili… 2018].
In addition, the Russian Federation became the subject of repressive actions by 
the EU and the US. Let us remind that in 2014–2018, limited access to foreign loans, 
a ban on imports of the energy equipment were among the most severe sanctions 
put on Russia. The sanctions imposed on Iran and Russia create a fertile ground 
for strengthening both countries’ cooperation. Supporting the region’s stability and 
preventing U.S. interference is another decisive factor.
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